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Abstract: The effect that migrant remittances have on school enrollment is a challenging 
relationship to empirically define, requiring both an analysis of the circumstances that lead a 
household member to emigrate from their home and equally, but not always independently, how 
the family makes investment decisions in the education of one or more of their children.  This 
study presents a new strategy to determine the nature of this relationship for households in        
El Salvador, using a 2SLS estimation with a wealth-stratified panel constructed from household 
survey data over a nine-year period. Employing this methodology to estimate the combined 
effects of both migration and remittances, I find a 0.15% increase in average state enrollment for 
every percent change in the number of migrants, with a moderate effect for public schools and 
larger relative effect for private schooling (0.14% vs. 0.43% respectively).  Remittances on the 
other hand only influence private school enrollment, where a percent increase in remittances 
leads to 0.37% increase in average enrollment within a state, driven principally by higher 
enrollments among lower-wealth Salvadorans at the grade school level.  The comparison of these 
results to yearly cross-section estimates suggests that the stratified panel is more reliable, being 
less susceptible to bias that arises from weak instruments and omitted trends. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Migrant income that is sent to families in their home country, generally referred to as remittances, is an 
increasingly common phenomenon in which labor is relatively mobile, information is easily shared and 
financial transfers are highly efficient.  The World Bank estimates that in 2012 there was a total of 
$410 billion in remittances sent to developing countries from an estimated 200 million migrant 
workers (WB, 2012).    These transfers provide direct financial support to families without the 
intervention of local government agencies, which rarely collect taxes on this income.  While 
remittances have a positive impact on consumption and immediate well-being for recipient 
households, the long-term effect is not entirely clear.  One obvious downside of migration is the 
absence of adult members for prolonged periods that results in a shortage of household labor and 
parenting, which could be detrimental to child development.  On the macroeconomic level, remittance 
income may represent a wage differential that makes labor in the domestic market relatively 
unattractive, which could lead to decreased productivity in the local economy, to the point that some 
economists argue that remittances can lead to a Dutch-disease phenomenon that could be detrimental 
over the long term (Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman, 2009).  On the other hand, if migration and 
remittances are not merely driving consumption but instead are being invested in productive 
investments, then the long-term effect may be positive.  For example, if migration is a strategic 
decision that is made by families in an effort to provide greater opportunities for their children, then 
remittances would likely lead to better than average outcomes. 
This study is an analysis of the response of household schooling decisions to changes in both 
migration and remittances.  A positive result would be contradictory to pure consumption theory, 
suggesting that household migration is at least in part an investment in children’s education.  Using 
national household survey data over a nine-year period I analyze this issue employing two independent 
estimation strategies: An instrumented cross-section and an instrumented wealth-stratified panel.  This 
methodology allows for the comparison of these two empirical estimations, leading to the 
identification of severe bias in the cross-section that I attribute to weak instrumentation and omitted 
variables, both of which are minimized when using the stratified panel.   
Overall, using the instrumented panel I conclude that while both migration and remittances 
have a positive effect on school enrollment, only the former is consistent across all education types 
and wealth levels.  I find a 0.15% increase in average state enrollment for every percent change in the 
number of migrants, with a moderate effect for public schools and larger relative effect for private 
schooling (0.14% vs. 0.43% respectively).  Changes in remittance transfers on the other hand only 
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influence private school enrollment, where a percent increase in remittances leads to a 0.37% increase 
in average enrollment, driven principally by lower-wealth Salvadorans at the grade school level.   
This research differs in a number of important ways from the existing literature on the impact 
of migration and remittances on investments in children’s education in Latin America.  First by 
compiling a new dataset made up of nine years of household survey data my analysis can use yearly 
cross sections to compare results across years that experience considerable exogenous variation due to 
the recession in the United States.   This multi-year dataset further allows me to employ a novel 
stratified-panel strategy to determine how average variations in subpopulations affect school 
enrollment at the state level.  Finally, this paper attempts to empirically identify the different 
mechanisms by which migration and remittances may impact school choice by instrumenting for both 
variables in a single regression, leading to the conclusion that while both have a positive effect on 
education, the effects are not synonymous. 
The following section provides a brief summary of the empirical methodologies and findings 
in the literature taking into consideration the challenge of investigating the role of migration and 
remittances on education.  Section 3 introduces my own investigation by presenting a new theoretical 
model that combines the expected remittance and migrant effect with Glewwe’s (2002) utilitarian 
model for education.  After a brief description of the dataset in Section 4, I present the empirical 
strategy in Section 5 that includes a detailed evaluation of my instruments.  Section 6 contains a 
summary of the results, followed by interpretation and conclusions in the final section.  
2. Background 
2.1 Endogeneity of Migration, Remittances and Education 
A brief review of existing empirical research makes apparent the need to address the high degree 
of endogeneity among the principal variables that determine the migrant, remittance and child 
education puzzle. For example, migration can effect education through three different channels: 
Directly by changing the household structure and requiring that children take up household 
responsibilities; Directly through the loss of income that results when an adult member of the 
household leaves; Or indirectly through the subsequent generation of remittances income.  
Moreover, some authors suggest that there may be an implicit difference between a household 
that chooses to migrate and its education decisions versus non-migrants, as they may for 
example be equally motivated in both instances by a desire to improve the wellbeing of their 
children (Acosta 2011), or alternatively that migrants through their experience gain a different 
(and possibly negative) appreciation for the value of schooling (Hanson & Woodruff, 2003).   
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Similar interactions have been argued for wealth with remittances or income and 
education, through both direct and indirect channels. It is also possible that reverse causation 
may make analysis challenging, for example Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010a) note that 
educational opportunity itself can stimulate remittances, especially salient when considering the 
context of extended family investing in a particular child that has a high propensity for success in 
academics based on the child’s character or the educational institutions available to them 
(Amuedo-Dorantes & Pozo, 2010a, p1751). 
To overcome the potential issues raised by endogeneity among variables, researchers 
have predominantly employed an instrumental variable for either migration or remittances in a 
2SLS estimation.   There have also been a limited number of natural experiments and 
randomized control trials in this field. Table A1 in the Appendix provides a brief summary of 
the existing research from Latin America, discussed in greater detail in the next section.  
 
2.2 Existing Empirical Research 
Aside from Cox-Edwards and Ureta (2003), the majority of empirical research considers the 
potential endogeneity problem of remittances and education as confounding and thus applies an 
Instrumental Variables (IV) approach with Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) to mitigate any bias, 
with historic migrant network patterns generally being the instrument of choice as an efficient 
predictor of current migration.  The dependent variable “education” is determined from survey 
data as a child’s current attendance or attainment, which can be measured in years as highest 
grade achieved.  The latter measure is argued by some authors (Hanson & Woodruf, 2003; 
McKenzie & Rapoport 2010) to be a more accurate determinant of investments in human 
capital.   
Within this body or research Borraz (2005) finds that attainment in Mexico improves by 
0.8 years on average for households that receive remittances, but that the effect is only 
statistically significant for households in small rural villages and in which the head of household 
has a low level of education.  This finding suggests less of an impact than Hanson and 
Woodruff’s (2003) research in Mexico which uses the same IV strategy to instrument for 
migration and determines a 0.73 to 0.89 additional years of schooling for girls (effect on boys 
was smaller and inconclusive) regardless of village size, though Borraz comments in his paper 
that the difference may stem from the methodology used that allowed him to identify with 
greater specificity the village size not possible in Hanson and Woodruff’s study. 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2010a, 2010b) use a similar strategy in two related 
investigations that determine the effect of remittances on education in the Dominican Republic 
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and Haiti.  While the authors also use historical migration patterns as their Instrumental Variable 
they interact this data the average employment rate and income for migrants in the United States 
to improve the precision of their estimate, and then control for whether the household has a 
migrant living abroad using a dummy variable in their main regression (Amuedo-Dorantes and 
Pozo, 2010, p1752).  This well-defined strategy allows the authors to better differentiate between 
the migrant effect and the remittance effect postulated in the theoretical literature, but 
introduces the potential for bias by including an endogenous repressor to the 2SLS estimate.  
While both studies find positive school attendance stemming from remittances, 3% in the 
Dominican Republic versus 4.7% in Haiti, this result is largely cancelled out by the negative 
migrant effects in the Domincan Republic while cutting by half the impact in Haiti, suggesting 
the importance of differentiating between the two channels in future research. 
Despite these findings, positive impacts with relatively small inconsistencies have not 
been universal in this area of research, with a number of important studies indicating a negative 
or null effect on education.  Acosta’s research (2006, 2011) in El Salvador finds that any 
statistical significant result (an improved 4.6% to 5.0% probability of attendance) becomes much 
weaker and loses statistical significance when controlling for household wealth, which he 
considers to be a critical determinant of education. McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) find similar 
results in northern Mexico, where using the historical migrant IV-strategy to predict current 
migration, they find that not only was there generally no effect on school attendance, but 
specifically attendance decreased for teenage girls and boys (14% and 22% respectively), which 
they determined through follow-up surveys to be related to boys following their migrant parent 
to the United States and girls generally leaving school to take up household responsibilities, 
especially caring for younger siblings.  Though the authors fail to convincingly identify the 
remittance effect, their findings suggests that the migrant effect may be greater than the 
remittance effect in some communities and between different children, and importantly that the 
perceived value of education may actually decrease if a child is probable to emigrate to a 
destination where their schooling is unlikely to have much perceived value. 
The use of natural experiments by some researchers seems to provide consistently 
positive estimates of remittances or migration on schooling. Adams and Cuecuecha (2010) 
analyze marginal household spending in Guatemala, using a novel IV-strategy of future 
migration patterns interacting with unexpected rainfall shocks in a past period to predict 
remittance spending in the current period, determining that each dollar remitted leads to an 
increase of $1.94 in educational spending by households on the margin.  Another IV-strategy 
used by Calero, Bedi and Sparrow (2009) in Ecuador provides similar results.  In this case, the 
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researchers use information on the proximity of the remittance receiving offices and the 
exogenous variation in transaction costs to predict remittance flows in the first stage of their 
2SLS analysis, allowing them to conclude that the average remittance amount leads to 2.59% 
higher probability of attendance for students, though this is negatively affected by income 
shocks.  Additionally, using multinomial Logit methodology they determine that the average 
remittance increases the likelihood of students to be enrolled in private schools by 12.3%, for all 
population groups even where no significant effect on school enrolment was observed (Calero et 
al., 2009, p1151). 
A natural experiment considered by Manuelita Ureta (2006) explores the devastating 
income shock that resulted from Hurricane Mitch in Nicaragua (October 1998).  Despite the 
significant negative impact on local agriculture and small business income caused by the storm, 
there is little decline observed in school enrollment.  Ureta stipulates that remittances play an 
important role in smoothing income shocks and that education remains a priority good for a 
household, which is supported by her data for rural areas, while urban households become more 
dependent on remittances for income over the long term (Ureta, 2006, p25).  While these 
findings do provide some evidence of the relationship between remittances and income due to a 
severe shock, the authors recognize challenges in their interpretations given the many possible 
confounding factors that may arise with such a severe storm.  A much clearer natural experiment 
was done by Yang (2008) in the Philippines in which heterogeneous effects on currency 
exchange due to the Asian financial crisis caused remittance values to vary exogenously.  In this 
case, Yang was able to identify that positive remittance shocks lead to greater schooling and 
educational expenditures. 
Finally, it is worth noting that while the gold standard of impact assessments is a 
randomized control trial, the complexity of the subject as well as the unpredictability and often 
“illegality” of migration makes it difficult implement such a strategy in this context.  The only 
exception is a recent paper by Ambler, Aycinena and Yang (2014) in which the authors design an 
interesting experiment with Salvadoran migrants that allows a migrant to send remittances to a 
specific student in their home country, with the potential for an additional subsidy given by the 
program at randomly assigned levels of 3:1, 1:1, 0:1 (or no program at all in the control).   Their 
hypothesis was that if the quality of education was considered a superior good to all other 
household goods, that there would be a “crowding-in” effect on educational spending, with 
remittance investments supported by other household income, as opposed to a “crowding out” 
effect that is expected if education and all other household goods are equally valued by the 
family.  One flaw in this experiment is that the subsidy determination needed to be provided 
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before the migrant made their remitting decision, so that subjects were able to opt-out of the 
program if desired, with the resulting participation rate corresponded directly to the subsidy level 
(18.5%, 6.9% and 0% respectively).   Controlling for this self-selection using an IV-strategy the 
authors still find strong evidence of a crowding in effect for the highest (3:1) subsidy group, of 
approximately $3.72 for every remittance dollar sent, driven entirely by the female student 
beneficiaries. 
 
3. Theoretical Model 
3.1 Migration and Remittance Theory 
The early models for economic migration are generally based in neoclassical economics, 
stipulating that the regional differences in the supply and demand of labor, and the wage 
disparity that emerges, will drive workers from low wage (or no wage) regions to more lucrative 
ones.  Marshall (1920) was one of the first to recognize this new trend in social behavior, in 
which technological developments brought on by the industrial revolution, in particular the 
printing press and railway networks, allowed individuals the information and the means to 
relocate at relatively low costs, not possible at any earlier point in human history.  Marshall’s 
model was further developed by Lewis (1954) and built upon by Todaro (1969) and Harris and 
Todaro (1970).  The last of these seminal papers makes considerable effort to explain the rural 
to urban migration observed at the time, by mapping it onto an explanatory model that 
considers the decisions that individuals make based on their expected net wage potential, which 
can lead to the decision to relocate.  
The new economics of labor migration that emerged in the 1980s (and consolidated by 
Stark and Bloom, 1985) account for the role that institutions can play in the decision-making 
process, most notably of which is the basic household unit.  Here the theory stipulates that most 
households tend to be risk-avoiding when income is involved but in an economy where income 
is sporadic or insufficient, labor migration of a family member may be the safest alternative, not 
to be construed as an automatic result but more commonly as a deliberate and implicit contract 
between a migrant and a group of non-migrants family members (Stark & Bloom, 1985, p175).   
This arm of theory is less static than its predecessors allowing for multiple equilibrium stemming 
from dynamic comparative advantage in multi-period strategy games between family members, 
as well as employers, workers and migrant communities. 
 Within the framework of the new economics of labor migration, the study of the 
remittance phenomenon has emerged as a critical motivating factor.   There are many 
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conceivable explanations for remittances that have been observed in the empirical research, 
including altruism but also income diversification, insurance against shocks, investment, or status 
building, many of which point towards the intended personal benefit that these capital flows may 
have.   Becker (1981) first considered the paradox of altruism among family members in an 
“otherwise selfish market”, in which an individual’s utility is a product of her own consumption 
as well as the consumption of her family.  Becker explains that part of the utility gained by the 
family altruist is the increased cooperation that it generates among members of the household 
that can increase efficiency through the trust it nurtures while also acting as an insurance 
mechanism especially in old age (Becker 1981, p10).  In early empirical testing of Becker’s 
altruism model, Stark & Lucas (1998) use data from Botswana and determine that a number of 
motivations for remittances were significant, each depending on a particular migrant’s 
circumstances, so that repayment for education, risk insurance and protection of inheritance 
rights are all separately identifiable and valid reasons to remit (Stark & Lucas, 1988, p478). 
The underlying message from both modern theory and empirics is the importance that 
non-migrant household factors play on the migrant’s decision to send remittances (Calero et al. 
2009, Yang 2008, Ureta 2006).  As summarized by Oded Stark (2009) in his review of the 
subject, the analysis of why a migrant sends money home is best understood when considering 
her as a strategic part of the household unit, and thus depends on the relative state of their 
family at the origin, especially if the migrant intends to return home in the future  (Stark, 2009, 
p6).   
The type of migration described by the likes of Becker or Stark coincides with the 
important recognition that temporary migration is an important part of modern labor mobility, 
with income sent directly to family back home through a wide-variety of remittance transfer 
mechanisms.  This more fluid flow of people and capital is considered a transient phenomenon, 
in which the key insight is that the migrant typically intends to return home after a period, which 
may or may not be defined at the outset (Jennisen 2007).  Using this theory as its foundation, the 
most recent research looks at the decision that migrant households make based on  “life-cycle” 
and “target-earnings” considerations (for a excellent review see Yang 2009).  In the former case, 
a migrant is weighing the tradeoff between migration and income in terms of their own time as 
the principal investment in their future financial well being, while in the latter case a migrant will 
determine the income needed in order to satisfy a specific threshold, such as the satisfactory 
investment in their children. 
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3.2 Education Investment Theory 
In many ways the most effective type of investment that a migrant can make is in the education 
of his or her children.   In El Salvador it has been stipulated that there is an 8-10% increase in an 
individual’s salary for each year of additional schooling they have (Funkhouser, 1996) which 
translates into an average variance of monthly salaries from $138 or $192 for someone with no 
or very basic education, to $425 or $638 for a technical college or university graduate 
respectively, a difference of 121% to 362% per month (Salamanca, 2010, p48).  From a 
theoretical perspective, when parents send their children to school it can be considered to be an 
investment in the quality of their children, a direct investment in their human-capital and in-turn 
the potential earnings that they can contribute to the household.   First modeled by Becker and 
Lewis (1974) as a quality versus quantity tradeoff that influences parental decision making when 
deciding how many children to have, the concept has been further developed to recognize the 
possible household choices that can be made in the education of children.   
Nonetheless, there is significant empirical evidence that occupations, educations and 
other characteristics of children tend to be highly correlated with their parents.  Given the 
apparent contradiction of high returns to education but low intergenerational mobility, especially 
in households where parents have a low level of education, the question becomes how 
households allocate their limited resources towards human capital investments.  Becker and 
Tomes (1994) resolve this apparent contradiction by presenting a model in which parents are 
assumed to maximize the welfare of children but only if there is no reduction in their own 
consumption or leisure.  In this light, investments in children’s education are made based on 
current earnings and wealth as well as endowments of the children and parents generosity 
towards them, with the equilibrium given by the perceived rate of return on the cost of 
education. In the case where parents have imperfect access to capital and cannot borrow to 
finance education, parents cannot separate their investments in children from other household 
expenditures (Becker and Tomes, 1994, p267).  The principal outcome of the model is that the 
major constraint on household investment in children’s education is the net income of the 
household relative to the endowment of the child, which includes wealth as well as inherited 
capacity and cultural norms. 
In a similar household decision-making model for child schooling, Glewwe (2002) 
considers the role that the parents’ discount factor plays and the value placed on education, 
relative to the school quality and cost.  The author derives a model for optimizing parents’ utility 
through investments in their children’s education, in this case assuming that parents can choose 
between public schools and higher-quality private schools at a higher price.  Glewwe 
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demonstrates that both quantity and quality of schooling should increase when parents place 
greater value on future consumption and have higher tastes for schooling, on the other hand the 
school quality increases only with the child’s perceived learning efficiency and decreases with the 
price of school (Glewwe, 2002, p440).  
 
3.3 A Consolidated Migration, Remittance and Education Model 
There are few models that directly consider the potential impact of migration and remittances on 
schooling.  One exception is provided by McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) in which each 
household has an unconstrained schooling function that presents the optimal utility that can be 
achieved from a child’s education investment if there were no budget constraint.  As in Becker 
and Tomes (1994) model, the reality is that each household faces their own limited budget that 
they can dedicate towards education, which is itself increasing in wealth and education.  The 
effect of remittances is to shift the budget constraint, so that the family can afford a greater 
amount of the ideal education.  But according to the model, a contrasting effect arises from 
migration, which shifts the unconstrained school utility function to the right as the opportunity 
cost of schooling increases for children and education becomes relatively less valuable in the 
context of labor migration to high-wage jurisdictions (McKenzie & Rapoport, 2010, p1345).  
Thus there is a competing effect of remittances versus migration on household educational 
spending.  
 In this analysis I use an adaptation of McKenzie and Rapoport (2010) to consider how 
migration and remittances are likely to affect education using Glewwe’s (2002) utility model as a 
starting point.  Glewwe’s model is summarized by the following equation: 
U = Y1 - poQS + δY2 + ((1 – S + δ)kπ + σ)αf(Q)g(S)  (1) 
Where S represents the amount of schooling and Q the quality chosen for a child, which are 
further defined in their functional form such that f(Q) = Qβ  and g(S) = Sγ.  The remaining terms 
in the equation are: ρo the base price of schooling (so that ρoQ gives the price of higher quality 
schooling), α is a child’s learning efficiency, π their cognitive skills in the labor market, δ is a 
relative weight parents give to future consumption, σ is parents taste for schooling, Y is income, 
and k proportion of income expected by parents from their children’s future earnings.   
I modify this model to include a remittance effect YR that relaxes the budget constraint: 𝑌! + 𝑌!   ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒  𝑌! ≥ 0   (2) 
as well as a migrant effect θ that influences the perceived returns to unconstrained schooling: 𝑆!!!  ,𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 − 1 ≤ 𝜃 ≤ 1   (3) 
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Substituting these terms into the original equation and optimizing for years of schooling (S*) and 
school quality  (Q*) at a price premium I find that both school attainment and quality are 
increasing with a positive shift in income that occurs with remittances (Figure 1).  This effect 
should be greater on Q* given that higher school quality comes at a higher direct cost, and not 
just the forgone wages that may occur if a child substitutes labor for school.  The effect of 
migration is ambiguous and may increase or decrease the unconstrained returns to schooling 
depending on the migrant experience as well as the 
labor demands created in the home through the 
absence of one of its members.  In this context, it is 
useful to return to Stark (2009) and Yang  (2009) to 
understand that migration is often a strategic 
decision made by the household, which may imply 
a sacrifice by parents in the current period with the 
intent of improving the economic opportunity for 
their children in the future. 
 
4. Data 
4.1 Salvadoran Household Survey Data 2004-2012 
This study uses a new compilation of cross-sectional data from El Salvador covering a nine-year 
period from 2004 until 2012.  This information is collected on an annual basis by the Salvadoran 
Statistics Bureau (DIGESTYC) and is a nationally representative random sample of households.  
Known as the Household Survey for Multiple Uses (EHPM by its Spanish acronym) the survey 
contains eight standard modules that include household data related to assets, agriculture, 
spending and remittances as well as individual data on education, health and income.  In order to 
compare information between years this data required extensive standardization and recoding, 
using the 2012 dataset as the baseline whenever possible and using this year as the base year for 
real comparisons of dollar values over time.  
I restrict the sample to school-aged children, from ages 6 to 19, with an average 12,750 
observations per year, for a total sample size of 115,084. Table 1 provides a summary of some 
key information about the sample.  The average age is 13.6, with slightly more boys than girls 
represented.  Household’s are predominantly rural (68%) and have an average of six members 
living together.  Nearly 67,000 or 58% of the sample are currently students, and of these only 
5.4% are attending private school (using the Ministry of Education definition of any school that 
Figure 1: Migration and Remittance Effect on 
School Investment 
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics 
is not operated by the government).  The average education level of adults in the home is 
midway through grade school.   With regard to migration, 20% of households have at least one 
member living abroad with 25.6% of homes receiving remittances.   
   
 
 
4.2 Salvadoran School Census Data 2004-2012 
This study also uses census data collected by the Ministry of Education on an annual basis from 
2004 to 2012 inclusive.  This is panel data collected directly from school administrators 
providing information on the total students registered per grade in every school location for 
every year, as well as gender and school characteristics for more recent periods.  Overall, there 
are an average of nine private schools per municipality but this varies widely with many 
municipalities having no private schools and the larger cities having several dozen, with San 
Salvador having an average of 206 per year.  Public schools are far more common, with a range 
from six to 318.  Given that the size of schools can vary drastically, especially between urban and 
rural locations, this study will focus on changes in enrollments.   
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 115162 13.57 3.794 6 19 
Female 115162 0.486 .500 0 1 
HH 
Population 
115162 6.01 2.452 1 23 
Urban 115162 .418 0.493 0 1 
Student 115162 0.582 0.493 0 1 
Private Ed. 66980 .054 0.227 0 1 
HH Adult 
Ed. 
115162 1.48 0.738 0 5 
HH Income 115162 609.57 1163.41 0 67967 
Remittance 115162 .256 0.436 0 1 
Migrant 115162 0.202 0.401 0 1 
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5. Econometric Strategy 
5.1 Wealth Stratification 
One of the possible avenues for endogeneity bias widely recognized in the literature is the role 
that wealth can play in both migration and remittances as well as education.  In general, the 
higher that household wealth is, the higher that most of these variables can be expected to be, 
but simultaneously wealth itself can also be the result of any combination of any of these 
variables, or a common unobservable such as grit or determination.  Therefore, simply including 
wealth in the 2SLS estimation will not eliminate the potential for omitted variable bias, and in 
fact may introduce new bias due to the endogeneity in the first stage regression.  In order to deal 
with this potential endogeneity, that is difficult to instrument for, a preferred strategy is to 
cluster the sample on observables whenever possible.  
The use of household assets has been used in research to create an index for which 
relative wealth can be compared (Acosta, 2001, p919).   I therefore employ principal-component 
factor analysis using measures of 16 household assets (see Table A2 in the Appendix) to generate 
12 groups of equivalent sample size of increasing relative wealth.   As seen in Figure 2 (or more 
completely in the wealth stratified summary statistics in Table A3 in the Appendix) the clustering 
of the sample by wealth does correspond with an increase in numerous variables including 
education and remittances.  In fact, in a small country such as El Salvador, the stratification by 
wealth may be more relevant to analysis than the traditional clustering by state, though I 
generally maintain both in throughout the estimations.  
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Figure 2: Asset Ownership by Wealth 
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5.2 Instrumental Variables 
According to econometricians such as Murray (2006) and Wooldridge (2013) 2SLS estimation 
with invalid instruments can inherently lead to biased and inconsistent estimations, more so than 
the corresponding least squares estimator, while “weak” instruments may fail to overcome the 
bias of OLS and lead to misleading estimates of statistical significance even with a very large 
sample size (Wooldridge, 2013, p499).   Angrist and Pischke (2009) demonstrate that a weak 
instrument leads to a low joint-significance (F-statistic) in the reduced form equation, so that the 
bias of 2SLS approaches the bias of OLS estimates, a problem that is exacerbated with an 
increasing number of weak instruments (p208).  Using the methodological approach outlined by 
these authors, this paper bases its evaluation on a number of determinants to ensure that 
instruments are not too weak and thereby endeavors to minimize potential bias and variance in 
the estimation.    
 Four instruments are proposed for this investigation, with the reduced-form results from 
the stratified panel presented in Table 2 and the cross-section reported in TablesA6 and A7 of 
the Appendix. The instruments are: The State-Level Historical Emigration Rate; Migrant 
Destination Employment Level; Salvadoran to American Unemployment Ratio; and the 
Salvadoran Homicide Rate.  In the cross-section analysis these variables are used in their base 
unit values (with remittances corrected for inflation to 2012 dollars) while in the panel they are 
both the natural logs of their values. 
State-Level Historical Emigration Rate (migrant_hist of Tables A6 and A7) has been used 
by numerous researchers when investigating the effects of migration or remittances (see Table 
A1 in Appendix).  This instrument is based on migration patterns that make emigration easier 
for subsequent members from the same community in what is often referred to as migrant 
network theory (Lindstrom & Ramirez, 2010; Adams & Page, 2005).   Indeed, this relationship 
seems to be consistent with the observed data (Table A4 in Appendix) with generally higher 
migrant numbers and remittance flows in Salvadoran States with greater historical migration.  
The data for this variable is constructed using the 2002 National Household Survey, as older 
data was unreliable, but tests against figures by Acosta (2010) that uses the 1993 census prove 
highly consistent.  We would expect this variable to be positively correlated with remittances and 
migration, which is what I find in the first stage of the cross-section estimation, with large 
coefficients (343 and 2.4 respectively) significant to the 1% level and consistent when controls 
are added.  The R-squared is .142 for remittances with controls and .077 for migration, which 
may suggest that the instrument is weak.  Because this measure provides for plausible exogenous 
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variation between states, I use is as an instrument on its own and interacted with the remaining 
instruments for all cross-section estimates. 
It is possible to construct a Migrant Destination Employment Level variable (lusemp in 
the tables) as 85% of Salvadoran emigrants have the final destination of the United States, with 
80% destined for one of five different States with high existing diaspora networks (see Figure A5 
in Appendix).  Moreover, over the period of this investigation the American “Great Recession” 
that resulted from the financial crisis on Wall Street in 2007 had a considerable impact on the 
labor market throughout the United States, providing exogenous variation to the instrument.  I 
use data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics on State and city employment levels at the 
annual mean, and aggregate only those locations and sectors predominated by Salvadoran 
migrants according to a 2009 report by the Migration Policy Institute (www.migrationpolicy.org).  
These employment levels seem plausible instruments for the capacity of migrants to earn money 
that they can remit to their families back home, as well as an indication of the potential “pull-
factor” in attracting migrants, therefore it is expected that this instrument be positively 
correlated with the endogenous variables.   For the cross-section I find the interaction term 
positive for both remittances and migration (149 and 0.44 respectively) and significant to the 1% 
level.  Similarly, first stage using panel data both variables are positively correlated at the 1% 
level when controls are included (0.885 and 1.11 respectively) with an R-squared of 0.126 and 
0.018. 
The Salvadoran to American Relative Unemployment Ratio is a variable that is similar to 
the employment variable, but provides a broader indication of relative well-being between the 
domestic and migrant labor markets.  Using official national unemployment figures published by 
the World Bank, this ratio is greater than one if unemployment is higher in El Salvador relative 
to the United States, and less than one otherwise.  This variable therefore indicates a relative 
economic attractiveness for migrants to find work internationally versus the domestic labor 
market, and may also represent relative hardship or need for families in El Salvador relative to a 
migrants ability to send remittances.  As it measures relative unemployment domestically, it is 
expected to show a positive relationship with the endogenous variables.   This is the finding for 
the panel data where the unemployment ratio is positive and significant to 5% for remittances 
and 1% for migrant number (coefficient are 0.13 and 0.29 with controls respectively).  With the 
cross-section the interacted term is negative but small for remittances (-2.112) and positive but 
small for migrants (0.005), though both are significant.
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Table 2: Instrument Evaluation for Panel Estimation 
 
VARIABLES (1) USem (2) USemp (3) unem (4) unem (5) homr (6) homr (7) USemp (8) USemp (9) unem (10) unem (11) homr (12) homr 
lusemp 1.277*** 1.109*** 
    
-4.681*** 0.885*** 
      -0.269 -0.332 
    
-0.258 -0.299 
    lHHinc 
 
0.0154 
 
0.00703 
 
-0.0681***   1.019*** 
 
0.998*** 
 
0.962*** 
  
 
-0.0265 
 
-0.0248 
 
-0.0261   -0.0258 
 
-0.0242 
 
-0.0257 
female 
 
-0.131 
 
-0.137 
 
-0.164   -0.0332 
 
-0.0406 
 
-0.0537 
  
 
-0.242 
 
-0.242 
 
-0.238   -0.285 
 
-0.284 
 
-0.282 
HHsize 
 
-0.0136 
 
-0.0161 
 
0.0261   -0.169*** 
 
-0.159*** 
 
-0.140** 
  
 
-0.063 
 
-0.0628 
 
-0.0619   -0.0569 
 
-0.0565 
 
-0.0551 
chldpop 
 
0.172** 
 
0.138 
 
0.225***   0.12 
 
0.126* 
 
0.165** 
  
 
-0.0869 
 
-0.088 
 
-0.0848   -0.0733 
 
-0.0747 
 
-0.0735 
unempratio 
  
0.335*** 0.294*** 
  
  
 
-0.827*** 0.134** 
    
  
-0.0621 -0.0725 
  
  
 
-0.0592 -0.066 
  homrate 
    
0.00440** 0.00674***   
   
0.0294*** 0.00328* 
  
    
-0.00213 -0.00233   
   
-0.00171 -0.00185 
Constant -12.87*** -11.59*** -1.662*** -1.733*** -1.576*** -1.745*** 45.47*** -10.07*** 3.969*** -2.137*** 1.398*** -2.149*** 
  -2.437 -3.021 -0.0637 -0.35 -0.125 -0.358 -2.335 -2.67 -0.0607 -0.322 -0.1 -0.323 
R-squared 0.018 0.022 0.024 0.026 0.004 0.021 0.126 0.56 0.076 0.558 0.088 0.558 
Stage 2 
      
  
     lmignum 0.16724 0.14172 0.15886 0.141 0.07755 0.1199 
        0.03724 0.0449 0.03147 0.03716 0.03723 0.04098 
      lremit 
      
-0.04562 0.17764 -0.0643 0.30993 0.01161 0.24653 
  
      
0.00379 0.06347 0.006 0.15614 0.00108 0.13992 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
Clusters 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 168 
  
      
  
     rk F-Stat 22.47777 11.14804 29.0938 16.43443 4.29224 8.35925 329.01462 8.78494 195.35314 4.10191 295.30045 3.14063 
AR F-Stat 209.5888 121.37609 217.00288 154.27001 230.27888 600.73061 209.58886 121.37609 217.00288 154.27001 230.27888 600.73061 
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The last of the instruments used is the national Homicide Rate in El Salvador (homrate) using 
data published by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).   This variable is 
measured by the number of homicides per 100,000 people, which often ranks the country as the 
most deadly globally compared to all other non-conflict nations.  As much of this crime is gang-
related or organized around global drug trafficking and extortion, exogenous variations are 
observed. It is plausible that homicide rates can represent a “push-factor” that motivates migration 
to less dangerous regions as well as a driving force for remittances as families are less able to earn a 
wage locally due to the risk of being extorted, kidnapped or worse.  It is therefore expected that the 
homicide rate should be positively correlated with both remittances and migrant numbers.  The 
first-stage results of the cross-section support this theory, with the interaction term positive and 
significant for both remittances and number of migrants (17.2 and 0.02 respectively). For the panel 
estimate this significant relationship is maintained (0.03 and 0.004) with an R-squared of 0.558 and 
0.021 for average remittances and migrant number respectively. 
 
5.2.1 Evaluation of the Instrumental Variables 
Of foremost concern in selecting instruments for 2SLS estimation is that each one must 
meet the “exclusion restriction” so the only channel for the instrument to effect the final outcome 
variable is through its effect on the instrumented variables, and that there is no possibility of reverse 
causality.  For example, it is difficult to envision a scenario where school enrollment in El Salvador 
would influence the employment rate in the United States, and the employment rate is likely to only 
affect schooling through migration or remittances. The Destination Employment Level and the 
Relative Unemployment Ratio seem to clearly meet the validity criterion.    
On the other hand, it is possible that areas with high crime rates, or areas under de facto 
control of gangs would be less desirable for teachers to live and may lead to low-quality education, 
which could in turn lead to a direct reduction in school enrollments or a move towards private-
school alternatives that offer better security.  While possible, the ubiquity of organized violent crime 
throughout the country and over the entire period of my analysis makes it unlikely that the relative 
insecurity of a state or region differ much from one period to another, holding the time invariant 
aspects of the location constant by adding these fixed effects to the estimations.   
The historical emigration rate, used by numerous researchers and central to my cross-
sectional estimation, may present more serious concerns with validity as the beach-head migration 
occurred no more than two generations ago and in many cases was the result of a civil conflict 
which likely had a legacy on schooling enrollment as well.   In particular, the regions of highest 
emigration are also the regions where the revolutionary forces found the greatest support and 
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therefore faced the greatest levels of upheaval and destruction during the 1970s and 1980s, as well as 
the lowest level of federal support in the decades thereafter (as the right-wing Arena party 
maintained the balance of political power after the conflict).  Both the pattern of migration and its 
socio-political legacy may be quite different from the patterns identified by Hanson and Woodruff 
(2003) and McKenzie and Rapoport (2011) in Northern Mexico, where they find persistent 
migration patterns that date back to the 1920s (McKenzie & Rapoport, 2011, p1338).  Furthermore, 
the relatively small size of El Salvador and the risk (both financially and physically) in attempting the 
journey north, may limit the effectiveness of the instrument on its own in this context, further 
exacerbating variance and possibly introducing greater bias into the 2SLS estimation which can lead 
to highly inconsistent results (Wooldridge, 2013, p499).  Nonetheless, given the fact that no other 
form of exogenous heterogeneity is observable, I implement this instrument for the cross-sectional 
analysis taking heart that similar research on El Salvador incorporates it.  I omit the variable from 
the panel estimation, as it is no longer necessary with time being the exogenous instrument. 
To further test the quality of the instruments, I compare second-stage results individually 
and in various combinations in order to determine “median-centered” estimates, by comparing the 
results of just-identified 2SLS and limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimations of 
over-identified models. As seen in Tables A6 and A7, the estimations in the cross-section on school 
enrollment consistently provide the similar results, -0.0009 at the 1% significance level for 
remittances and -.15 at 1% significance for the number of migrants including controls.  The 
estimations for private education are universally smaller but just as consistent across specifications.  
These estimations are consistent with LIML estimation, essentially delivering the same coefficients 
and standard errors.  In almost all cases the F-statistic is well above 10 for the cross-section, with the 
Anderson-Ruben F-Statistic also relatively high.   The Hansen J-Statistic on some occasions is 
somewhat high, though this is usually only the case when controls are included. 
 
5.2.2 Selection of Instruments 
 Having determined the individual instruments to be valid but weak, the final selection of 
which combination of instrument to use is largely determined by the Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald     
F-Statistic, which should be close to 10 to avoid possible bias from weak instruments (Angrist & 
Pischke, 2009, p213), a rule of thumb that was followed within the constraints of the previously 
discussed tests.  Ultimately, a set of instruments was chosen that offered the highest consistency 
across estimations so that comparisons could be made of the resulting local average treatment effect. 
For the panel estimation I work backwards considering the full estimation, in which both 
total remittances and number of migrants are instrumented for in the structural equation, to 
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determine which instruments are likely to provide the most consistent and unbiased results.   As 
seen in Table 3, showing the regression results of the principal specifications, the just-identified 
estimation using employment level and the unemployment ratio has the highest F-statistic both in 
reduced form specification and even with controls is above 10.  Being a just-identified model there 
is no J-Statistic to report.  The over-identified model that adds the domestic homicide rate to this 
specification is therefore somewhat more attractive as the consistency of estimates can be tested 
using the LIML and Hansen J-Statistic, the former being highly consistent and the latter being 
sufficiently low so that the null-hypothesis of cannot be rejected, giving confidence in the validity of 
the instruments.  Ultimately I choose to use the over-identified specification to provide the most 
exogenous variation possible given the close relationship between my endogenous variables, while 
maintaining statistical integrity that should allow for confidence in the results.   
For the estimation in cross section the statistical tests of the second-stage, together with the 
relatively homogeneous first-stage results, suggest that almost any combination of instruments will 
provide consistent results, aided in part by the large sample size.  I therefore present the fully over-
identified model here (to match the panel estimation described next) and provide the results of the 
just identified model (with only historical migration as an instrument) as a robustness check. 
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TABLE 3: SUMMARY OF INSTRUMENT QUALIFICATION FOR PANEL  
First Stage (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  VARIABLES lmignum lmignum ltotremit ltotremit 
  
       log(usemp) -1.133 -1.788 -13.30*** 4.663*** 
  
 
-0.99 -1.122 -0.92 -1.028 
  unempratio 0.593*** 0.649*** 2.124*** -0.844*** 
  
 
-0.222 -0.245 -0.206 -0.226 
  homicide 0.00438* 0.00512** 0.0159*** 0.00545*** 
  
 
-0.00238 -0.00244 -0.00201 -0.002 
  Constant 8.068 14.06 120.3*** -43.93*** 
  
 
-8.8 -10.05 -8.182 -9.196 
  
       Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
  Groups 168 168 168 168 
  R-squared 0.03 0.034 0.209 0.564 
  
       Second Stage 
   
(5) (6) 
     
combined combined 
l_mignum 0.14435 0.13446 
  
0.13889 0.13579 
 
0.02587 0.02809 
  
0.02511 0.02845 
LIML 0.14963 0.13539 
  
0.13914 0.13664 
 
0.0277 0.02847 
  
0.02519 0.0288 
l_totremit 
  
-0.01513 0.04022 -0.00774 -0.00561 
   
0.00145 0.01014 0.00595 0.02943 
LIML 
  
-0.10022 0.59697 -0.00772 -0.00586 
   
0.07904 1.85363 0.00596 0.02984 
Controls N Y N Y N Y 
F.E. Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       rk F-Stat 11.76639 8.41586 248.74282 8.51073 11.5323 8.82335 
AR F-Stat 259.50772 358.48443 259.50772 358.48443 259.50772 358.48443 
AR chi2 784.22301 1.09E+03 784.22301 1.09E+03 784.22301 1.09E+03 
J-Stat 1.53418 0.16858 116.69506 86.33956 0.07048 0.14379 
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5.3 Regression Specification 
The principal objective of this paper is to determine if educational enrollment varies when 
there is a change in remittances or the number of migrants in a household.  In theory, this can be 
determined in two ways with the data I have.  The first is to use the data in cross-section and 
thereby compare each individual’s household with all the other individual’s households, holding time 
and place constant, to see if those households that receive remittances or that have migrants are 
more likely to have children in school relative to their peers.  The second estimation technique is to 
use a fixed effects panel to compare households over time.  Because the data I have is a fresh 
randomized sample each year, comparing individual households over time is not possible, but by 
using stratification through factor analysis I am able to set up a representative sample of wealth-
groups for each state that can be compared over time, the details of this stratification are described 
at the beginning of this section.   
The 2SLS estimation on the pooled cross-section employs Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
with either number of migrants (mignum) or total remittances (totremit) as the endogenous repressor 
and either school enrollment (student) or private school enrollment (edprivate) as the dependent 
variable.  Therefore, the first stage is one of the following: 𝑟𝑒𝑚𝚤𝑡_𝑡𝑜𝑡!!!" =   𝛿! + 𝛿!𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡_ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!" +   𝛿!𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∗𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!" + 𝛿!𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∗𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!" + 𝛿!ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!"+ 𝑋!! + 𝜑! + 𝜏! + 𝜙!" +   𝜇   
 𝑚𝚤𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚!!!" =   𝛿! +     𝛿!𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡_ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!" + 𝛿!𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∗𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!" + 𝛿!𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑝 ∗𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!"     + 𝛿!ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒 ∗𝑚ℎ𝑖𝑠𝑡!"+ 𝑋!! + 𝜑! + 𝜏! + 𝜙!" +   𝜇 
 
where the subscript i represents each individual of household h of state j at time t.  The model is 
over-identified using all the instruments described in the previous section, interacted with state-level 
historical migration migrant_hist, which provides the contemporaneous variation required for 
analysis.  Also included is a vector of household level controls Xhi  as well as a vector of state 
dummies 𝜑! , year dummies 𝜏!, and the interaction terms 𝜙!", the details of which are discussed in 
more detail in the next section.  The second stage of the cross section estimation is given by: 𝑆∗ = 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡!!!" =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑟𝑒𝑚𝚤𝑡_𝑡𝑜𝑡!!!" + 𝑋!! + 𝜑! + 𝜏! + 𝜙!" +   𝜀 
or; 𝑆∗ = 𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑡!!!" =   𝛽! + 𝛽!𝑚𝚤𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚!!!" + 𝑋!! + 𝜑! + 𝜏! + 𝜙!" +   𝜀 
 
where S*=studentihjt  is the probability that a child in a given household from a given state at a 
particular year will be enrolled in school.  This is the structural equation of the 2SLS estimation and 
uses the predicted values from the first stage to provide the Local Average Treatment Effect on 
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education enrollment.  The controls are the same as the first stage and assumed to be exogenous.  
The same estimation is also used to predict Q* , the probability that a student is enrolled in private 
school.  In the case of analysis limited to individual years, the controls for time and their state 
interactions are not included. 
 The second econometric technique that is employed, estimates the changes in school 
enrollment at the state level by identifying changes in average migration and remittances for each 
wealth-stratified group over the nine years of panel data.  This remains a 2SLS strategy using OLS 
for both stages, but in this case the dependent variable is the log of a state’s school enrollment (Stot) 
or public school enrollment (Stotpu) or private school enrollment (Stotpr) respectively.  As previously 
described, this data comes directly from the annual census made by the Ministry of Education in El 
Salvador.  When both predicted average total remittances (ltotremit) and predicted average migrant 
number (lmignum) are used in the structural equation, the two reduced form equations are:  𝑙𝑜𝑔  (𝑟𝑒𝑚𝚤𝑡_𝑡𝑜𝑡!!") =   𝛿!𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!!" + 𝛿!𝑙_𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦!!" + 𝛿!ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!!" + 𝑋!!" + 𝛼!! +   𝜇!!" 𝑙𝑜𝑔(𝑚𝚤𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚!!") =   𝛿!𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!!" + 𝛿!𝑙_𝑈𝑆𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦!!" + 𝛿!ℎ𝑜𝑚𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒!!" + 𝑋!!" + 𝛼!! +   𝜇!!" 
 
which are followed by the second stage: 𝑙_𝑒𝑛𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡!!" =   𝛽!𝑙_𝑟𝑒𝑚𝚤𝑡_𝑡𝑜𝑡!!" + 𝑙_𝑚𝚤𝑔𝑛𝑢𝑚!!" + 𝑋!!" + 𝛼!! +   𝜀!!! 
 
 where w represents the wealth stratified duo-decile for each state j at a given time t.   unempratio, 
USemploy, and homrate are the excluded variables used to instrument remittances and migrants, 
described in detail in the previous section.  Xwjt is a vector of controls averaged to the level of 
stratification (described in the next section) while 𝛼!" are the time-invariant characteristics of each 
group eliminated by the analysis and 𝜀!"# is the disturbance term absorbing all the variation in 
enrollment not predicted by the other covariates. 
 
5.4 Selection of Control Variables 
While there are a number of independent variables that have been identified in the theoretical 
literature to influence decisions in education, many of which are observable in the data, most of 
these covariates are also highly endogenous with decisions to migrate or remit and education 
decisions.  As an example, parents’ education is commonly found to be highly predictive of their 
children’s education but in the context of migrant households the level of education may also 
influence the decision or capacity to migrate so including it in the estimation may bias results 
through its influence on the first-stage of 2SLS.  On the other hand, failing to include critically 
influential variables would cause the entire estimation to suffer from omitted variable bias, in which 
the coefficients on the key variables could be severely over or under-estimated as they absorb the 
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effect of the missing variables, potentially leading to spurious correlations.  It is therefore best 
practice in 2SLS to include as many exogenous explanatory variables as possible in both stages of 
the estimation, while avoiding the inclusion of endogenous regressors. 
 For the estimation using the data in cross-section the principal controls are State and Year 
dummy variables, including their interaction, allowing for the analysis of the specific household 
remittance and migrant effect on schooling decisions while holding specific annual state effects 
constant.  Additionally, because of their potential bearing on results I also include household income 
(logged), average children’s age (and average age squared) average gender of the children in the 
household (using a female dummy), as well as the number of children in the household and the 
overall population of the household, as indicators of how income must be shared among its 
members.  
 For the panel estimation, a number of controls are omitted.  Most obviously, here the only 
fixed effect included is the stratified wealth duo-decile by state group, which is compared over time, 
allowing for the within group variation that is of interest for this analysis.  Beyond this set of 
controls, average gender is also included though likely of little influence in this context.  More 
importantly, two exogenous trends are added as controls given the possibility that their exclusion 
could potentially bias results as omitted variables.  2SLS is particularly sensitive to the influence of 
underlying trends in either the dependent in independent variables, and therefore must be included 
(Wooldridge, 2013, p517).    
The first trend is the domestic economic trend, which is represented in Figure 3, where a 
dramatic decline is observed following the US recession, which cannot be attributed to a drop in 
remittances but was likely related to a fall in the export of goods and services.  Because the changes 
in domestic production likely have a different impact by wealth level and location, and as this 
analysis already uses wealth and state averaged values, household income (logged) is used as a better 
indicator of domestic economic wellbeing.  The second trend that is likely to bear influence on 
school enrollments is the birth rate, which as seen in Figure 4, fell over the period of analysis (with 
6-year lagged birth rates shown).  If not accounted for, this drop in birth rates would potentially bias 
the estimates of remittances or migration on enrollments.  Again, because the trend may have a 
differential effect by wealth and location, the average household child population is used as a more 
precise control, with overall household size included to account for the greater household 
population.  Therefore, while income and child population are also used in the cross-section their 
inclusion in the stratified panel is specifically to control for trends over time.   
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 5.5 Controlling for Serial Correlation and Heterogeneity  
 Estimations on individual enrollments using cross-section data are averaged to the 
household level to account for all unique household characteristics.  By weighting the estimation to 
the household level the estimator uses the robust sandwich estimator, accounting for heterogeneity.  
Moreover, because remittances, migration and education are largely a household-level decision serial 
correlation is unlikely.  Nonetheless, as a robustness check I use state-level and wealth-level 
clustered standard errors.  For panel estimates, serial correlation over time is a principal concern, for 
which I employ clustered standard errors estimator at the wealth-state group level. 
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6. Results 
6.1 Pooled and Annual Cross-Sections 
Table 4 shows the results of the estimation on children’s school enrollment using a Pooled 
Cross-Section.  The coefficients using OLS, almost certainly biased by endogeneity, are positive for 
both remittances and migration, where the coefficient is reported as a percentage point change, in 
decimal form, in the probability of a child being a student, significant to the 1% level.  Implementing 
the 2SLS estimation the significance remains but both the effect of each variable independently 
becomes negative and much larger, though the effect is mitigated somewhat when controls are 
added (columns 4 and 8) almost all of which are significant to the 1% level. 
 
 
TABLE 4: POOLED CROSS SECTION ESTIMATE OF REMITTANCES 
OR MIGRAITON ON SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
 
 
Measured by Remittances Measured by Migrants 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES OLS OLS IV IV OLS OLS IV IV 
Total Remittances ($100) 0.00304*** 0.00162*** 
-
0.0796*** -0.0592***   
   
 
-5.82E-04 -4.91E-04 -0.0102 -8.29E-03   
   Number of Migrants 
    
0.00554*** 0.00540*** -0.149*** -0.118*** 
     
-0.00186 -0.00158 -0.0146 -0.0127 
Household income (log) 
 
0.0517*** 
 
0.102***   0.0518*** 
 
0.0808*** 
  
-0.00206 
 
-0.0072   -0.00206 
 
-0.00365 
Urban 
 
0.0760*** 
 
0.0554***   0.0764*** 
 
0.0558*** 
  
-0.00317 
 
-0.00451   -0.00318 
 
-0.0039 
Age 
 
0.293*** 
 
0.295***   0.292*** 
 
0.297*** 
  
-0.00273 
 
-0.003   -0.00273 
 
-0.00285 
Age (squared) 
 
-0.0133*** 
 
-0.0134***   -0.0133*** 
 
-0.0135*** 
  
-0.000102 
 
-0.000113   -0.000102 
 
-0.000107 
Female 
 
-0.00478* 
 
0.000288   -0.00471* 
 
-0.00333 
  
-0.00285 
 
-0.00324   -0.00285 
 
-0.00296 
Household Population 
 
-
0.00250*** 
 
-
0.00567***   
-
0.00255*** 
 
-
0.00329*** 
  
-0.000808 
 
-0.000998   -0.000808 
 
-0.000852 
Number of Children 
 
-0.0206*** 
 
-0.0185***   -0.0205*** 
 
-0.0206*** 
  
-0.00138 
 
-0.00156   -0.00138 
 
-0.00143 
State*Year Y Y Y Y   
   Constant 0.493*** -1.068*** 0.513*** -1.310*** 0.492*** -1.068*** 0.539*** -1.203*** 
 
-0.0106 -0.0215 -0.011 -0.0396 -0.0106 -0.0215 -0.0119 -0.026 
     
  
   Observations 115,156 115,084 115,156 115,084 115,156 115,084 115,156 115,084 
R-squared 0.01 0.299 
  
0.01 0.299 
  rk F-Stat 
  
117.5 111.4   
 
290.7 287 
J-statistic 
  
26.98 31.77   
 
17.31 14.33 
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An indication that bias may be present in the 2SLS cross-section estimation is that the yearly 
data provides strikingly different results, with no clear discernable pattern.  As seen in Figure 5, the 
effects vary widely each year, though they are consistently negative.  The average migrant effect is a 
12.2 percentage point decrease in probability of school enrollment for each additional migrant that is 
away from the home, but this effect ranges from -8.9 to -20.1.  A much more significant variation 
can be seen using instrumenting for remittances, where the average over the period is 16.1 
percentage point decrease for every additional $100 received by the household in remittances, with a 
wide range of effects from -1.7 in 2007 to -26.6 a year earlier.  When adding the controls to the 
estimation the effect of one or both of the variables becomes insignificant at the 10% level for four 
of the five years.  Similar, but in no way related, results occur when estimating student enrollment in 
private schools using the yearly data (not included but available) suggesting the counterintuitive 
notion that higher remittance income leads to lower public or private school enrollment and the 
even less logical result that lower remittances lead to increases in private schooling. 
 
The inconsistency of these results between yearly cross-sections is concerning as it strongly 
suggests the presence of continued endogeneity or omitted variable bias.  If the former were the 
case we may expect to see estimations biased towards the estimates of OLS (Angrist & Pischke, 
2009, p208).  On the other hand, if omitted variable bias were influencing the outcomes then 
perhaps stratification of the sample by wealth would resolve some of these issues.  Table A8 in the 
Appendix shows the results of the pooled cross-section stratified by wealth duo-decile, including 
controls.  Considering only the results that are significant to the 10% level, it appears that there is a 
decreasing negative effect of migration and remittances with wealth on school enrollment, and that 
-­‐0.3	  -­‐0.25	  
-­‐0.2	  -­‐0.15	  
-­‐0.1	  -­‐0.05	  
0	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	  
Ef
fe
ct
	  o
n	  
St
ud
en
t	  E
nr
ol
lm
en
t	  
FIGURE 5:  YEARLY CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATE OF STUDENT 
ENROLLMENT 
-by remittances value or migrant number 
per	  Migrant	   Migrant+	   per	  Remittance	  ($100)	   Remittances	  ($100)+	  
 26 
for the higher wealth median the effect is relatively consistent at approximately -19 percentage 
points per additional migrant or -8.6 percentage points per additional $100 in remittances.  Though 
the private school enrollment estimation (Table A9) is far less consistent with no discernable pattern 
through the wealth stratification.  This result combined with consistently negative coefficients 
suggests that the estimation may still be biased or that the instrument may not be strong enough.  
Further analysis of these results occurs in the discussion section of this paper, taken in the context 
of the Wealth-Stratified Panel estimation results described in the next section.   
 
6.2 Wealth-Stratified Panel  
In order to analyze how changes in migration and remittances affect school enrollment over time, I 
group each year’s data into a stratified wealth and state cohort and use the mean of this data to make 
within-group comparisons.  The results from the 2SLS estimation on public and private school 
enrollments are presented in Table 5 and Table 6.  In this case we continue to see negative 
coefficients on the instrumented remittance variable (-.94% per percent change in remittances) but 
this changes to positive (3.5%) when controls are included, which in this case include trends for 
average household income and child populations, both of which are significant to the 1% level.  
Looking at the instrumented effect of migration in isolation, we see a strong positive relationship of 
.145% or 0.139% corresponding to each percentage change in the number of average migrants, 
before or after including controls respectively.  Moreover both the F-statistic and J-statistic are 
within the acceptable range (7.77 and 0.424 respectively), while the aforementioned remittance 
results are associated to uncomfortably high J-statistics (93.0 with controls).  Most interesting for 
this analysis though is the outcome of the combined estimation, in which the results also seem 
statistically robust.  Here we see remittances lose its significance while migration remains consistent 
at 0.142% and 0.143% (without and with controls respectively) and significant to the 1% level.  
None of the controls are significant.   
 Considering private school enrollment the trend is very similar to the public school 
estimation when the estimations are run in isolation, though the estimated effects are much larger at 
.519% per percent change in average remittances and .528% per percent change in average migrants.  
But it is the combined estimation with controls that again provides the most interesting results. 
Similar to the public school estimate, average migrant number remains positive and highly 
significant and only slightly diminished in effect at .428%, but in this case the effect of remittances 
also remains positive and significant with an estimated average effect of 0.367%.   
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TABLE 5: WEALTH STRATIFIED PANEL ESTIMATES ON 
AVERAGE STATE PRIVATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
 
VARIABLES 
(1)   
Remit 
(2) 
Remit 
(3) 
Migra 
(4) 
Migra 
(5) 
Combined 
(6) 
Combined 
log(remittances) -0.0094*** 0.0346*** 
  
-0.00581 -0.0165 
 
-0.000775 -0.00912 
  
-0.00492 -0.0312 
log(migrants) 
  
0.145*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.143*** 
   
-0.0272 -0.03 -0.0268 -0.032 
log(HHincome) 
 
-
0.0446*** 
 
-
0.00580* 
 
0.0105 
  
-0.00902 
 
-0.00343 
 
-0.0311 
Female 
 
0.00392 
 
0.0225 
 
0.0224 
  
-0.0166 
 
-0.0336 
 
-0.0336 
HH population 
 
0.0115*** 
 
0.00398 
 
0.00153 
  
-0.00345 
 
-0.00875 
 
-0.00998 
Child populatio 
 
0.0244*** 
 
-0.0023 
 
-0.00056 
  
-0.00445 
 
-0.013 
 
-0.014 
F.E. 
(wealth*state) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
Clusters 168 168 168 168 168 168 
rk F-stat 327.9 8.303 10.66 7.768 10.53 7.074 
J-stat 133.1 93.05 1.469 0.424 0.268 0.163 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 6: WEALTH STRATIFIED PANEL ESTIMATES ON AVERAGE 
STATE PRIVATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
 
VARIABLES 
(1)   
Remit 
(2) 
Remit 
(3)    
Migra 
(4) 
Migra 
(5) 
Combined 
(6) 
Combined 
log(remittances) -0.0947*** 0.519*** 
  
-0.0793*** 0.367*** 
 
-0.0054 -0.112 
  
-0.021 -0.135 
log(migrants) 
  
0.657*** 0.528*** 0.616*** 0.428*** 
   
-0.132 -0.121 -0.125 -0.125 
log(HHincome) 
 
-0.549*** -0.0218* -0.0218* 
 
-0.384*** 
  
-0.111 
 
-0.0129 
 
-0.135 
Female 
 
-0.0155 
 
0.038 
 
0.0397 
  
-0.157 
 
-0.137 
 
-0.168 
HH population 
 
0.130*** 
 
0.0459 
 
0.100** 
  
-0.0338 
 
-0.0343 
 
-0.0451 
Child population 
 
-0.035 
 
-0.0708 
 
-0.110** 
  
-0.0451 
 
-0.0504 
 
-0.0551 
F.E. 
(wealth*state) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
Clusters 168 168 168 168 168 168 
rk F-stat 327.9 8.303 10.66 7.768 10.53 7.074 
J-stat 93.93 30.91 13.89 28.28 4.55 17.52 
 
 
  
 28 
 
Some of the controls in the combined model are also significant and worth noting.  In particular 
household income is negative and similar in size to the remittance effect (at -.384%) suggesting 
perhaps that increased income is achieved when children substitute education for labor.  Average 
household size is positively correlated with private school enrollment, significant to the 5% level, 
suggesting perhaps that more people in the home provide greater earning capacity as well as 
minimizing the need for older siblings to leave school early to look after younger siblings.  Indeed, 
the average number of children in the home is negative and significant to the 5% level, which would 
be consistent with Becker’s quality model, in which fewer children can receive greater individual 
investments in their quality that would otherwise need to be divided or rationed. 
 Overall, the impact of migration and remittances on total school enrollment is dominated by 
the public school effect, given the relative size to private schools, as seen in Table A10 in the 
Appendix, where the combined model with controls shows that average migrant numbers lead to a 
0.151 increase in average state enrollment.  Similar to the public enrollment estimation, remittances 
are not significant nor are any of the controls. 
 Finally, using the stratified-wealth panel I check for heterogeneous treatment effects by 
limiting the estimation by wealth median as well as grade or age cohort (Figure A11 in the 
Appendix).  While the loss in sample size vastly decreases my estimation power, these results remain 
informative as a guide to which sub-group may be driving the results.  In terms of public schooling, 
where migration was the only significant predictor of enrollment, we find both low and high wealth 
children benefit from greater levels of average migration (0.126 and 0.176 respectively), though the 
significance only 5% for the lower group versus 1%.  It also appears that older children (from 11-19 
years of age) may benefit more among the lower wealth median while younger children (from 6-15) 
are the principal beneficiaries among the higher wealth median.  Overall, using average state 
enrollment levels in 2012, a one percent increase in average state migration leads to an increase of 
approximately 310 students in the state’s public schools. 
 Using the same estimation technique for private schooling we find that the migrant effect 
predominates among higher wealth children, but that a lot of the shortcoming is made up for among 
the lower wealth median by remittances, with the majority of the remittance effect is among grade-
school level students.  While the migrant effect is positive and significant for all ages (from 6-19) for 
wealthier Salvadorans in the sample, it is principally among older children (11-19) for the lower-
wealth cohort, and to a much lesser degree.  
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7. Discussion  
Instrumental variables are consistent if they satisfy two principal conditions: The instrument 
and the endogenous variable must be correlated (corr(z,x)≠0), and the instrument and the 
disturbance term must be uncorrelated (corr(z,ε)=0).   If these conditions are only partially met, then 
weak correlation between the instrument and the instrumented variable can lead to large asymptotic 
bias even if z and ε have a low level of correlation.  This bias results from the calculation of the 
coefficient on the instrumented variable, given by:   𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚𝛽!" = 𝛽 + !"##(!,!)!"##(!,!) ∙ !!!!   (Wooldridge, 2013, 
p499).  A stratified-panel may diminish this bias (relative to a pooled cross-section) as it is the 
average correlation of z to x relative to the mean for each stratum over time that must not equal 
zero (corr(zwjt, xwjt)≠0) and importantly the correlation of the instrument should on average be zero 
with the mean-differenced error term from the structural equation.  Therefore, only systemic 
correlations between the z and ε within each stratum should present potentials for bias.  Similarly, 
the natural variation in ε should be reduced in the stratified-fixed effects estimation, given the 
elimination of any time invariant aspects (awj) at the group level and the use of averaged data, which 
further reduces the heterogeneity observed in the population (σε and σx).  Considering that the 
instruments employed in this analysis are relatively weak, this may be one potential reason for the 
inconsistency of the cross-sectional data and the relative robustness of the panel-estimate.  
 Another possible explanation for the inconsistent results in the cross-section is the difficulty 
of expressing exogenous trends in this estimation.  Analysis using pooled cross-section typically 
removes the time aspect from the analysis, done by adding 
time fixed effects or simply limiting the analysis to a single 
period, yet the elimination of time itself from the estimation 
does not mitigate the possibility of exogenous trends acting at 
any given moment in time.  In this analysis, the income of 
households in particular was affected by shifts in the 
domestic economy independent of migration and remittance 
flows. A period-to-period loss in income for a household may 
result in a need for increased remittances and potentially a 
decline in costly private-school enrollment, which if not 
accounted for in an estimation would bias the remittance 
coefficient on education downwards. This is precisely what 
we observe if the stratified panel estimation on private 
VARIABLES (1) (2) 
  
  ltotremit 0.367*** -0.134*** 
  -0.135 -0.0266 
lmignum 0.428*** 0.601*** 
  -0.125 -0.133 
lHHinc -0.384*** 
   -0.135 
 Controls Y Y 
wealth*state Y Y 
Observations 1,512 1,512 
Groups 168 168 
rk F-Stat 7.074 8.247 
J-Stat 17.52 0.223 
 
Table 7: Average Private School Enrollment  
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education is repeated omitting the control for average household income (Table 7).  The stratified-
panel has an important advantage in this respect as change over time within each strata is the 
measure of interest, so that conditional on the fact that trends are accounted for, the deviation of 
income from the group mean is the context for the estimation of the coefficient on remittances.  
Thus, these results suggest that the potential for cross-sectional estimation of social behaviours to 
suffer from omitted variable bias and spurious correlations may be higher for behaviours that are 
inherently more dynamic and contextual. 
Failing the circumstances that allow for a valid natural experiment, in which an exogenous 
shock can help to isolate the effect of only one of these variables, researchers must be particularly 
vigilant when working with secondary data to determine a relationship between remittances and 
education.  The results of this study suggest that one possible explanation for the wide discrepancy 
in results obtained in the literature may be partially attributed to omitted variable bias and weak 
instrumentation.   Most of the research in this field has used only a single year of survey data making 
counterfactual observations over time impossible.   Nonetheless comparing the estimates from a 
cross-section using different periods or different quantiles may indicate problems of consistency, as 
it has here.  
One drawback of the stratified-panel strategy is the need to average data over periods which 
may affect the estimation of standard errors by underestimating the underlying variance, which is 
further confounded by the substantial reduction in sample size.  Bootstrapping estimates may 
minimize these issues.  Finally, it may be possible that given the high correlation between the 
endogenous regressors and the potential endogeneity of the controls (namely household income and 
child population) that neither estimation presented in this analysis can be truly free of bias, which 
would point to a limitation in 2SLS in tackling highly endogenous social behaviours. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 Reviewing the overall results of the stratified-panel I determine that remittances and 
migration both play an important role in school enrollment decisions.   Indeed, contrary to the 
findings by McKenzie and Rapoport (2011), there is no evidence of a negative migrant effect in El 
Salvador, but instead a globally positive migrant effect that while most pronounced among higher 
wealth Salvadorans, increases average school enrollment by 0.15% for every 1% increase in the 
average number of migrants.  The difference from the literature may stem from the fact that the 
McKenzie and Rapoport study in particular looked at populations in the North of Mexico with a 
long-legacy of migration, which may have more propensity to migrate at a younger age in 
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comparison to Salvadorans where emigration to the United States is a much more costly and risky 
endeavour. 
 Remittances also play a positive role in stimulating education investments, but only in the 
choice of higher-quality and more expensive private schools.  A one percent increase in average 
remittances increases private school enrollment by 0.37%, driven almost entirely by lower wealth 
households and especially at the grade-school level.  The fact that remittances and migration have 
different effects that can be distinguished using 2SLS estimation strongly suggests that each 
regressor describes a separate channel with differing influence on school enrollment.  While this may 
be a product of measurement error stemming from survey instruments providing more reliable 
estimates of migrant numbers than remittance income, I believe that the degree to which these 
empirical results are supported by the theoretical models, does point towards distinct mechanisms.   
One possibility is that migrant households do have more unobservable determination and 
focus on improving the opportunities for their children than non-migrant households, which could 
directly translate into higher school enrollment, even in lieu of remittances.  This explanation is 
plausible in the context of higher public school enrolments where the principal cost is the forgone 
wages that a child could earn in the labour force.  But considering that migration also has a large and 
significant impact on private-school enrollment an alternative explanation may be that temporary 
migrants return home regularly with income earned abroad that is not considered by the family as a 
“remittance” as such.  Instead households may consider remittances to be a special flow of income 
from abroad, perhaps from non-household migrants such as distant relatives, which provide an 
irregular insurance mechanism in the case of economic shocks.  Along these lines, Yang (2008) 
proposes that researchers but analyze the inherent goal of migration and remittances in order to 
understand its impact.   In this light, migrant income may be considered to be “life-cycle” income by 
the household, where the implied objective is a sacrifice in the current period in order to generate 
greater opportunity for children in a future period, which may be distinct from remittances as 
“targeted-earnings” that are required to overcome a particular income shock.   
 These findings present a new perspective for future research, in which the distinct channels 
of migration and remittances could be further defined.  The use of other instruments such as 
environmental phenomena or the implementation of strict new regulations may be good candidates 
to help determine how changes in migration and remittances impact education or other productive 
investments over time.  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1: Empirical Research from Latin America 
AUTHOR YEAR PLACE MIG REM 2SLS MAIN FINDING 
‘14 Ambler, Aycinena, 
Yang  2012 SAL C C *Experiment 
+$3.72x school subsidy (in high 
treatment) 
Neutral otherwise 
‘11 McKenzie & 
Rapoport 1997 MEX IV - Historic Migration 
- Attainment 22% teenage boys 
- Attainment 14% teenage girls 
‘10 Acosta 1998 SAL IV - Wealth, Hist. Migration  No effect 
‘10 Amuedo-Dorantes 
& Pozo 2000 DR C IV 
Avg. Income & 
Hist. Migration 
+ Attendance 3% girls for non-
migrant HH 
No effect on migrant HH 
’10 Amuedo-Dorantes 
& Pozo 2000 HTI C IV 
Avg. Income & 
Hist. Migration 
+ Attendance 4.7% for non-
migrant 
+ Attendance 2-2.8% for 
migrant 
’10 Adams & 
Cuecuecha 2000 GUA - IV 
Hist. Migra, 
US Employ + $1.94 HH spending per $1 
‘09 Calero, Bedi & 
Sparrow 2006 ECU - IV 
Proximity of 
Western Union 
+ Attendance 2.59% per avg. 
remittance 
‘07 Malone 2000 MEX IV IV Wealth &      Hist. Migra 
+ Attainment 0.323 per year of 
fathers migration 
’06 Ureta 1998 -2001 NIC C C 
*Natural 
Experiment 
+ Attendance for urban during 
income shock 
No effect for rural 
‘06 Acosta 1998 SAL - IV Historic Migration + Attendance 4.6%  No Effect with wealth control 
‘05 Borraz 2000 MEX - IV Historic Migration + Attainment 0.8  
‘03 Hanson & 
Woodruff  2000 MEX IV - Historic Migration + Attainment +0.6 girls  
’03Cox-Edwards & 
Ureta  1997 SAL C C 
Remittances (for 
income) 
+ Attendance 14-54%  
(rural/urban) 
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Table A2: Summary of Wealth Index Data 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HHblender 104587 .4048878 .4908727 0 1 
HHrooms 104587 2.259 1.282248 1 13 
HHcelphn 104587 .6874277 .4635439 0 1 
HHcompu 104587 .0418981 .2003573 0 1 
HHdomemply 104587 .0132808 .1144751 0 1 
HHfan 104587 .2488646 .4323572 0 1 
HHintrnt 104587 .0161684 .1261233 0 1 
HHiron 104587 .7049825 .4560528 0 1 
HHmicrow 104587 .0520906 .2222108 0 1 
HHradio 104587 .4773155 .4994875 0 1 
HHrefrig 104587 .4427223 .4967108 0 1 
HHsew 104587 .0876686 .2828137 0 1 
HHsoundsys 104587 .4040751 .4907145 0 1 
HHvehic 104587 .0720166 .2585166 0 1 
HHvideo 104587 .2832952 .4506007 0 1 
HHwasher 104587 .0372991 .1894946 0 1 
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Table A3: Summary Statistics by Wealth Sextile
 
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 
Children (n) 19740 18711 19224 19176 19217 19094 
       Age 13.340 13.49*** 13.60** 13.57 13.639 13.76*** 
 
(3.877) (3.764) (3.758) (3.785) (3.770) (3.791) 
Female 0.486 0.490 0.485 0.486 0.486 0.485 
 
(0.499) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) (0.500) 
HH_Population 6.014 6.19*** 6.2 6.00*** 5.959 5.68*** 
  (2.537) (2.559) (2.546) (2.394) (2.402) (2.214) 
Telephone 0.000 0.007*** 0.046*** 0.139*** 0.302*** 0.650*** 
 
(0.010) (0.089) (0.209) (0.346) (0.459) (0.477) 
Urban 0.221 0.291*** 0.380*** 0.446*** 0.516*** 0.659*** 
 
(0.415) (0.454) (0.485) (0.497) (0.500) (0.474) 
HH_income 342.38*** 442.78*** 504.16*** 588.91*** 699.91*** 1085.16*** 
  (582.22) (732.27) (818.89) (957.75) (1116.85) (2022.16) 
Avg_Adult_Ed 1.07 1.25*** 1.41*** 1.53*** 1.65*** 2.00*** 
 
(0.625) (0.618) (0.631) (0.649) (0.672) (0.834) 
Student 0.438 0.529*** 0.575*** 0.617*** 0.641*** 0.692*** 
 
(0.496) (0.499) (0.494) (0.486) (0.480) (0.461) 
Private_Ed 0.006 0.013*** 0.022*** 0.032*** 0.054*** 0.164*** 
  (0.075) (0.117) (0.145) (0.176) (0.226) (0.371) 
Remittance 0.088 0.127*** 0.194*** 0.282*** 0.377*** 0.468*** 
 
(0.283) (0.334) (0.395) (0.450) (0.485) (0.499) 
Migrant 0.068*** 0.098*** 0.153*** 0.221*** 0.301*** 0.373*** 
 
(0.251) (0.297) (0.360) (0.415) (0.458) (0.484) 
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Table A4: Relationship between State Historical Migration and Average Current Migration and 
Remittances from 2004-2012 
 
State 
Historical 
Migration 
Number of 
Migrants 
Total 
Remittances 
    Ahuachapan 0.106 0.284 47.832 
Santa Ana 0.180 0.437 89.013 
Sonsonate 0.139 0.171 32.936 
Chalatenango 0.239 0.527 109.246 
La Libertad 0.138 0.219 50.041 
San Salvador 0.114 0.145 38.882 
Cucatlan 0.121 0.181 41.661 
La Paz 0.143 0.239 56.405 
Cabanas 0.260 0.664 119.523 
San Vicente 0.189 0.372 74.040 
Usulutan 0.203 0.388 73.274 
San Miguel 0.222 0.565 116.828 
Morazan 0.269 0.523 95.820 
La Union 0.374 0.731 133.911 
    Total 0.181 0.359 71.932 
 38 
 39 
Table A6: Pooled Cross-Section Instrument Evaluation for Remittances 
VARIABLES (1) mig_hist (2) mig_hist (3) emp_mh (4) emp_mh (5) unemp_m (6) unemp_m (7) hom_mh (8) hom_mh (9) ehu_mh (10) ehu_mh 
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
State*Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
migrant_hist 370.0*** 342.7*** -203.1** -336.6*** 620.6*** 544.2*** -767.1*** -677.0*** -1,129*** -1,189*** 
  -27.04 -26.34 -98.56 -97.2 -53.81 -52.03 -147.9 -144.4 -158.8 -155.8 
lemp_mhist 
  
125.4*** 148.7*** 
    
132.9*** 155.1*** 
  
  
-19.82 -19.64 
    
-19.81 -19.63 
unemp_mhist 
    
-2.627*** -2.112*** 
  
-2.282*** -1.894*** 
  
    
-0.33 -0.319 
  
-0.283 -0.274 
hom_mhist 
      
19.16*** 17.19*** 18.70*** 16.93*** 
  
      
-2.901 -2.829 -2.864 -2.793 
Constant -27.64*** -441.6*** -838.0*** -1,402*** -17.55*** -433.7*** 8.870*** -408.2*** -841.7*** -1,404*** 
R-squared 0.112 0.142 0.112 0.143 0.112 0.142 0.112 0.143 0.113 0.144 
student                     
totremit -0.00098 -0.00072 -0.00098 -0.00072 -0.00098 -0.00083 -0.00079 -0.00069 -0.00078 -0.00059 
  0.00011 0.00009 0.00011 0.00009 0.00012 0.00011 0.00011 0.0001 0.0001 0.00008 
LIML 
  
-0.00099 
 
-0.00099 
 
-0.00084 
 
-0.00082 -0.00063 
  
  
0.00011 
 
0.00012 
 
0.00012 
 
0.00011 0.00009 
rk F-Stat 130.87364 131.09556 130.87364 131.09556 95.72529 88.96737 195.3277 178.10318 118.79817 114.31104 
AR F-Stat 63.67703 50.97821 63.67703 50.97821 54.67049 48.82137 54.67169 48.74782 31.85361 25.50105 
J-Stat 0.44416 8.01297 0.44416 8.01297 2.99478 3.83558 21.28866 16.51373 22.4962 25.21519 
edprivate                     
totremit -0.00018 -0.00013 -0.00018 -0.00013 -0.00017 -0.00012 -0.00015 -0.00012 -0.00014 -0.00011 
  0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00005 0.00004 0.00005 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 0.00004 
LIML 
  
-0.00018 
 
-0.00017 
 
-0.00015 
 
-0.00014 -0.00011 
  
  
0.00005 
 
0.00004 
 
0.00004 
 
0.00004 0.00004 
rk F-stat 60.87092 58.65692 60.87092 58.65692 44.6927 40.37229 103.9023 94.4888 61.69306 59.51675 
AR F-Stat 10.10462 4.64535 10.10462 4.64535 10.38052 5.15636 10.10431 4.43773 5.22859 2.71598 
J-Stat 0.05825 0.03445 0.05825 0.03445 5.9781 4.41983 4.88285 1.35079 8.18748 4.71092 
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Table A7: Pooled Cross-Section Instrument Evaluation for Number of Migrants 
VARIABLES (1) mig_hist (2) mig_hist (3) emp_mh (4) emp_mh (5) unemp_m (6) unemp_m (7) hom_mh (8) hom_mh (9) ehu_mh (10) ehu_mh 
Controls N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y 
State*Year Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
migrant_hist 2.495*** 2.364*** 0.707** 0.354 2.128*** 1.839*** 1.001** 1.234*** -1.293** -1.429** 
  -0.0828 -0.0807 -0.314 -0.308 -0.27 -0.264 -0.459 -0.451 -0.621 -0.61 
lemp_mhist 
  
0.391*** 0.440*** 
    
0.390*** 0.435*** 
  
  
-0.0614 -0.0602 
    
-0.0613 -0.0602 
unemp_mhist 
    
0.00385 0.00550** 
  
0.00384 0.00516** 
  
    
-0.00263 -0.00258 
  
-0.00263 -0.00258 
hom_mhist 
      
0.0252*** 0.0190** 0.0277*** 0.0221*** 
  
      
-0.00779 -0.00765 -0.0078 -0.00766 
Constant -0.0505** -1.402*** -2.578*** -4.245*** -0.0653*** -1.423*** -0.00256 -1.365*** -2.530*** -4.190*** 
R-squared 0.041 0.077 0.042 0.077 0.041 0.077 0.042 0.077 0.042 0.078 
student                     
mignum -0.15496 -0.12345 -0.15496 -0.12345 -0.15005 -0.12523 -0.14916 -0.12524 -0.15235 -0.12225 
  0.01482 0.01285 0.01482 0.01285 0.01523 0.01344 0.01525 0.01349 0.0147 0.01279 
 LIML 
  
-0.15519 
 
-0.15018 
 
-0.1493 
 
-0.1529 -0.12239 
  
  
0.01484 
 
0.01524 
 
0.01526 
 
0.01476 0.0128 
rk F-Stat 575.13666 563.14552 575.13666 563.14552 460.74097 437.00034 454.53801 429.02837 288.93945 283.43276 
AR F-Stat 63.67703 50.97821 63.67703 50.97821 54.67049 48.82137 54.67169 48.74782 31.85361 25.50105 
J-Stat 1.90472 0.6044 1.90472 0.6044 1.12708 0.40885 1.11828 0.31601 4.79217 1.34342 
edprivate                     
mignum -0.02964 -0.02154 -0.02964 -0.02154 -0.02937 -0.02151 -0.02817 -0.02023 -0.02989 -0.02249 
  0.00675 0.00711 0.00675 0.00711 0.00661 0.00698 0.00647 0.00685 0.00677 0.00715 
 LIML 
  
-0.02966 
 
-0.02942 
 
-0.02819 
 
-0.02995 -0.02253 
  
  
0.00676 
 
0.00661 
 
0.00647 
 
0.00679 0.00717 
rk F-Stat 278.37257 266.28539 278.37257 266.28539 228.19256 212.35525 224.85181 207.93177 140.21465 134.92415 
AR F-Stat 10.10462 4.64535 10.10462 4.64535 10.38052 5.15636 10.10431 4.43773 5.22859 2.71598 
J-Stat 0.7745 0.70601 0.7745 0.70601 1.67608 1.87033 0.63666 0.02203 2.64776 2.58052 
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TABLE A8: POOLED CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATION ON STUDENT ENROLLMENT – BY WEALTH DUO-DECILE 
VARIABLES W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 
             mignum -0.277 -0.137 -0.298*** -0.408*** -0.163** -0.226*** -0.158*** -0.133*** -0.300*** -0.107*** -0.0937*** -0.181*** 
 
-0.197 -0.0863 -0.0657 -0.0873 -0.074 -0.0565 -0.0449 -0.0327 -0.0592 -0.0414 -0.0319 -0.0504 
Constant -1.192*** -1.163*** -1.102*** -0.931*** -1.022*** -0.749*** -0.870*** -0.750*** -0.886*** -0.696*** -0.432*** -0.266*** 
 
-0.0633 -0.0774 -0.0742 -0.0873 -0.0803 -0.0877 -0.0848 -0.0833 -0.0951 -0.084 -0.087 -0.0959 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,328 8,388 10,047 8,653 9,693 9,526 9,576 9,578 9,563 9,647 9,551 9,534 
rk F-Stat 8.612 23.97 31.09 22.14 17.41 26.35 32.28 31.65 16.8 16.11 20.28 8.871 
archi2 3.096 5.356 48.48 41.92 14.37 28.68 17.79 25.42 45.26 8.956 14.41 23.73 
J-Stat 0.83 2.098 15.25 4.436 7.75 7.312 2.983 4.838 1.202 1.127 5.007 3.125 
             VARIABLES W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 
             totremit -0.0938 -0.0387 -0.155*** -0.164*** -0.0507*** -0.0840*** -0.0567*** -0.0935*** -0.111*** -0.0455*** -0.0654*** -0.123*** 
 
-0.00351 -0.00059 -0.00188 -0.000628 -0.000224 -0.000533 -0.000386 -0.000577 -0.000343 -0.000414 -0.000285 -0.000306 
Constant 0.347*** 0.300*** 0.481*** 0.521*** 0.470*** 0.510*** 0.530*** 0.634*** 0.567*** 0.649*** 0.747*** 0.729*** 
 
-0.0303 -0.0332 -0.0438 -0.0334 -0.0331 -0.0399 -0.0399 -0.0409 -0.0396 -0.0424 -0.0509 -0.0507 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Observations 11,339 8,401 10,053 8,657 9,697 9,527 9,585 9,591 9,564 9,650 9,553 9,539 
rk F-Stat 1.964 8.337 12.91 14.36 17.25 11.83 19.16 7.391 11.49 6.339 8.42 2.656 
AR chi2 1.578 2.264 54.08 47.78 17.36 30.03 13.83 27.9 46.58 19.14 24.9 19.28 
J-Stat 0.734 2.068 4.127 14.04 14.44 6.257 0.476 3.054 25.35 2.177 11.42 14.98 
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TABLE A9: POOLED CROSS-SECTION ESTIMATION ON PRIVATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT – BY WEALTH DUO-DECILE 
VARIABLE W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 
             mignum -0.00537 -0.0497*** -0.0216 -0.0213 0.0336 -0.0391** -0.0361* -0.0408*** -0.0401* -0.0385 -0.0926*** -0.186*** 
 
-0.021 -0.0183 -0.027 -0.0294 -0.028 -0.0182 -0.0212 -0.0128 -0.0216 -0.0275 -0.0316 -0.0578 
Constant 0.0353* 0.0767*** 0.0245 0.0685 0.0774** 0.0506 0.00953 0.0013 0.0029 0.000568 0.139* -0.154 
 
-0.0188 -0.0254 -0.038 -0.0495 -0.038 -0.0496 -0.0377 -0.0477 -0.0458 -0.0553 -0.0725 -0.114 
             Observations 4,755 3,893 5,178 4,718 5,487 5,561 5,858 5,965 6,047 6,271 6,344 6,866 
rk F-Stat 2.845 11.24 12.15 8.502 9.199 19.72 18.57 18.7 6.963 6.64 10.07 6.744 
AR chi2 6.346 10.04 5.58 9.402 3.704 6.791 8.655 18.05 5.457 3.752 17.85 18.06 
J-Stat 6.044 5.176 3.121 3.82 1.415 3.792 2.766 1.206 3.067 1.959 7.965 2.446 
             VARIABLE W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 W9 W10 W11 W12 
             totremit -.000083 -0.00053** -0.000172 0.000178 0.000163 -0.000124 -0.00024** -0.00049** -9.82E-05 -0.000191 -0.000569 -0.000898* 
 
-0.00022 -0.000231 -0.000226 -0.000162 -0.000129 -0.000102 -0.000119 -0.000235 -7.58E-05 -0.000165 -0.000356 -0.000473 
Constant 0.0259 0.0617** 0.011 0.0964* 0.0868** 0.0422 -0.0174 -0.101 -0.0275 -0.0879 -0.167 -0.452** 
 
-0.0276 -0.0271 -0.0424 -0.0534 -0.0407 -0.0569 -0.0439 -0.0789 -0.0576 -0.0957 -0.194 -0.192 
             Observations 4,755 3,893 5,178 4,718 5,487 5,561 5,858 5,965 6,047 6,271 6,344 6,866 
rk F-Stat 1.016 6.439 8.321 8.439 7.976 8.305 11.99 5.01 8.519 4.047 4.054 1.368 
AR chi2 6.346 10.04 5.58 9.402 3.704 6.791 8.655 18.05 5.457 3.752 17.85 18.06 
J-Stat 6.123 4.546 1.921 8.329 0.761 6.116 1.035 0.0938 4.25 2.206 8.377 3.043 
 43 
 
TABLE A10: WEALTH STRATIFIED PANEL ESTIMATES ON AVERAGE 
STATE SCHOOL ENROLLMENT 
VARIABLES 
(1)         
Remit 
(2)         
Remit 
(3)         
Migra 
(4)        
Migra 
(5) 
Combined 
(6) 
Combined 
       
log(remittances) -0.0134*** 0.0548*** 
  
-0.00944* 0.00103 
 
-0.000868 -0.0127 
  
-0.00546 -0.0333 
log(migrants) 
  
0.163*** 0.151*** 0.158*** 0.151*** 
   
-0.0302 -0.0325 -0.0295 -0.0334 
log(HHincome) 
 
-0.0659*** 
 
-0.00681* 
 
-0.00783 
  
-0.0126 
 
-0.00373 
 
-0.0333 
female 
 
0.00171 
 
0.0211 
 
0.0212 
  
-0.0214 
 
-0.0364 
 
-0.0364 
HH population 
 
0.0161*** 
 
0.00546 
 
0.00561 
  
-0.00439 
 
-0.00949 
 
-0.0109 
Child population 
 
0.0205*** 
 
-0.00568 
 
-0.00579 
  
-0.00553 
 
-0.0141 
 
-0.0146 
F.E. (state*wealth) Y Y Y Y Y Y 
       
Observations 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 1,512 
Clusters 168 168 168 168 168 168 
rk F-stat 327.9 8.303 10.66 7.768 10.53 7.074 
J-stat 128.9 71.14 3.095 1.256 0.649 1.244 
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Figure A11: Summary of Wealth Stratified-Panel Results by School Type 
